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authorNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2014-02-17 09:33:31 -0500
committerNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2014-02-17 09:33:32 -0500
commitfc4a04a3c4f49ac8a74241401ffd5118c4d00842 (patch)
tree2f54d5fb41c13d0fdcb85b2f6df93ba8a48c80e3 /src/pl/plperl/plperl.c
parent475a1fbc41a120ea3bd5f903e37c48d7a1769ff8 (diff)
Prevent privilege escalation in explicit calls to PL validators.
The primary role of PL validators is to be called implicitly during CREATE FUNCTION, but they are also normal functions that a user can call explicitly. Add a permissions check to each validator to ensure that a user cannot use explicit validator calls to achieve things he could not otherwise achieve. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). Non-core procedural language extensions ought to make the same two-line change to their own validators. Andres Freund, reviewed by Tom Lane and Noah Misch. Security: CVE-2014-0061
Diffstat (limited to 'src/pl/plperl/plperl.c')
-rw-r--r--src/pl/plperl/plperl.c4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/pl/plperl/plperl.c b/src/pl/plperl/plperl.c
index de8cb0e0476..930b9f04b85 100644
--- a/src/pl/plperl/plperl.c
+++ b/src/pl/plperl/plperl.c
@@ -1856,6 +1856,9 @@ plperl_validator(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
bool istrigger = false;
int i;
+ if (!CheckFunctionValidatorAccess(fcinfo->flinfo->fn_oid, funcoid))
+ PG_RETURN_VOID();
+
/* Get the new function's pg_proc entry */
tuple = SearchSysCache1(PROCOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(funcoid));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
@@ -1935,6 +1938,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(plperlu_validator);
Datum
plperlu_validator(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
+ /* call plperl validator with our fcinfo so it gets our oid */
return plperl_validator(fcinfo);
}